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An overview of the Trusted Computing Exemplar 
(TCX) research project and its accomplishments to 
date are presented.  The TCX project is constructing 
a separation kernel that will be high assurance and 
suitable for use in simple embedded systems. To 
guide the kernel development, we have created a 
reusable high assurance development framework.  
The main emphasis of this multifaceted research and 
development initiative is to transfer knowledge and 
techniques for high assurance trusted system 





Development of high assurance security products 
requires knowledge and techniques not commonly 
taught to or practiced by most software developers in 
the commercial sector.   The lack of rigor and 
discipline in the software development process, 
driven by the focus on short time-to-market, 
performance and functionality, has produced rampant 
security vulnerabilities that gravely affect a large 
range of computing environments, from small deeply 
embedded safety applications to large enterprise 
software platforms.   
 
This situation provides the impetus for the Trusted 
Computing Exemplar (TCX) project, whose goal is to 
provide an openly distributed worked example of 
how high assurance trusted computing components 
can be built [1].  Our approach to meeting this goal is 
described in Section 2.   
 
It is our expectation that the open availability of the 
TCX results will enhance the capability to develop 
highly secure software in both commercial and open-
source sectors.  In particular, the high assurance 
development framework can be reused or adapted to 
                                                 
1 This work was sponsored in part by the Office of Naval 
Research and the National Reconnaissance Office.  Any 
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations 
expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval 
Research or the National Reconnaissance Office.  
 
support the development of secure systems that are 
more complex than the TCX demonstration system.  
The relevance of the TCX project is exemplified 
further by the surge of recent interest in high 
assurance systems, separation kernels, and evaluation 
profiles. [2, 3, 4]    
 
This work-in-progress paper presents a brief 
overview of the TCX project and summarizes its 
current development status. 
 
2. Project Description 
 
The TCX project encompasses four related activities, 
an overview of which is presented in this section. 
• Creation of a reusable high assurance 
development framework; 
• Development of a reference-implementation 
trusted network component; 
• Support for evaluation of the reference 
component against the highest assurance criteria 
as defined in the Common Criteria (EAL7) [5];  
• Open dissemination of the results of the first 
three activities. 
 
2.1   Reusable Development Framework 
 
The TCX development framework consists of two 
major components:  1) high assurance life cycle 
framework and 2) high assurance rapid development 
environment (HARDE).  The TCX life cycle model 
has augmented the spiral life cycle model [6] with the 
high assurance properties required by the EAL7 life 
cycle requirements.  Rigorous configuration 
management and strict developmental security 
safeguards are part of the high assurance life cycle 
framework.   
 
The TCX development environment consists of a 
documentation integration environment with which to 
construct and manage TCX project documents; 
development tools and procedures for construction of 
TCX software; and verification tools and procedures 
with which to determine with high assurance whether 





2.2   Reference Implementation 
 
In general, kernel software is highly specialized and 
not well understood in the software development 
community.  Adding high assurance security 
requirements to this mix increases the level of 
development effort exponentially.  We have chosen 
to develop a high assurance separation kernel, along 
with a trusted demonstration application built to be 
hierarchically layered [7] on the Kernel, as a 
reference implementation for trusted computing.    
 
The high-level requirements of the TCX Separation 
Kernel (TCX-SK) are: simplicity, compactness, 
portability, and an a priori assurance against system 
subversion.  The primary security function of the 
TCX-SK will be to enforce process and data-domain 
separation, while providing basic operating system 
services sufficient to support specialized   
applications.  The kernel will have a static runtime 
resource configuration and its security policy 
regarding access to resources will be based on static 
process/resource access bindings, which are subject 
to offline configuration. The kernel will implement 
static scheduling and support a small number of 
processes, data objects, and I/O devices.  The kernel 
initialization component will bring the system into a 
secure initial state.  All subsequent operations will be 
formally demonstrated to preserve the secure state. 
 
 
Figure1.  MYSEA System Architecture: Client-TPE-
Server 
 
An application running on the TCX-SK will serve to 
demonstrate the kernel’s utility and effectiveness.  
The application is the trusted path extension (TPE), 
which communicates security critical information 
between a user and a remote secure server, such as in 
the MYSEA distributed security architecture (see 
Figure 1 [8]).   
 
2.3   Reference Component Evaluation 
 
An independent security evaluation is required to 
provide confidence in the assurance claims made for 
a trusted component.  Although the evaluation target 
for the TCX-SK is EAL7, currently there is not 
available a validated EAL7 protection profile for 
separation kernels.   We have been working with the 
NSA as part of a team to develop an EAL6+ 
protection profile for separation kernels, which is in 
the draft form [4].  Our participation in the authoring 
of the separation kernel protection profile (SKPP) 
will aid the development of the Security Target 
specification [5] for the TCX-SK.    Although the 
TPE application software will be designed and built 
to meet EAL6 requirements, there are currently no 
plans for its evaluation. 
 
2.4   Open Dissemination 
 
The outputs of this project will be openly available. 
This will include source code, specifications, and 
evaluation evidence and reports.  By making 
available the various high assurance internal 
engineering specifications, evaluation and 
development framework documents, this project will 
provide previously unavailable how-to examples for 
high assurance trusted computing.   
 
3. Project Status 
 
The TCX project was initially conceptualized in late 
2002 and project work was started in mid 2003. The 
feasibility of the effort was studied and it was 
determined that the static nature of the system, the 
simplicity of the policy to be enforced, as well as the 
considerable previous experience in high assurance 
development of our team made the project feasible 
within the timeframe envisioned.   Since then, 
significant progress has been made in the following 
areas:  threats and requirements analysis, formal 
model, life cycle management and development 
environment.   
 
3.1   Threats and Requirements Analysis 
 
The overarching concern addressed in very high 
assurance systems is the threat of subversion of the 
system itself by an adversary [9]. We have examined 
various threat models in the context of protecting 
high value information with a high assurance 
separation kernel, and derived from these threat 
models a set of security objectives and requirements, 
which were included in the SKPP. The SKPP only 
defines the minimal requirements for a class of high 
assurance separation kernels. Thus, we have 
completed the development of the top-level policy 
and requirements definitions specific to the TCX-SK.  
For Common Criteria evaluation, a security target 
document is required that provides further detail 
about the implementation.  We have produced a first 
draft of the TCX-SK Security Target.   
 
3.2   Formal Model 
 
The separation kernel concept was introduced in the 
early 1980s [10] and has since been used in a number 
of operational systems and research projects [11, 12]. 
In a separation kernel, the system entities are 
partitioned into blocks, which are to be kept separate 
from each other, with the exception of certain 
carefully controlled interaction channels.  Despite the 
resurgence of interest in the separation kernel 
approach, the principle of least privilege [13] is often 
overlooked in the design of traditional separation 
kernels due to the belief that a separation kernel 
should only be concerned with partition-level 
resource isolation. Consequences of this omission 
include problems relating to all-or-nothing security 
and over-privileged programs. 
 
We believe that to provide credible high assurance of 
policy enforcement, a system based on the separation 
kernel abstraction must be enhanced to support the 
principle of least privilege.  A least privilege 
separation kernel can provide, in addition to the 
functionality and protection of the traditional 
separation kernel, a high level of confidence that the 
effects of activities caused by subjects (the system’s 
active entities) may be minimized to their intended 
scope.  This will make the system inherently more 
secure.   
 
We have developed a formal presentation and 
discussion of the least privilege separation model that 
supports two orthogonal flow policies: 1) block-to-
block flow control and 2) least privilege flow control 
between subjects and resources [14].  As the basis for 
a formal demonstration that the TCX-SK system 
enforces its security policy, we have implemented a 
preliminary version of this model with the Formal 
Development Methodology (FDM) tool set.  In 
addition to an interactive theorem prover, FDM 
includes linguistic support for reasoning about the 
relationship between different levels of abstraction of 
a given system security property, for both state-based 
and transition-based properties.   
  
3.3   Life Cycle Management 
 
The TCX life cycle management process and 
configuration management (CM) scheme will satisfy 
the life cycle and CM assurance requirements defined 
in the SKPP.  To date we have produced the 
following documents:  Life Cycle Management Plan, 
Configuration Management Plan and Procedures, 
Personnel and Physical Security Plans.  The Life 
Cycle Management Plan is the overarching document 
that defines policy, process and procedures to guide 
the TCX development and to ensure that the 
development is compliant with EAL7 assurance 
requirements.   
 
The objectives of the CM plan include: ensuring the 
integrity of the configuration items, tracking changes 
to the configuration items, and ensuring that only 
authorized changes are made to the configurations 
items. Items to be managed under this plan include 
all documents, source code, specifications, and other 
items written, used or developed (including bug 
reports, security flaws, and CM and development 
tools) as part of the product development process.    
 
Because of the nature of the project, integrity is the 
primary policy concern of the Personnel and Physical 
Security Plans, though confidentiality is not 
disregarded (e.g., with respect to unintended 
dissemination of incomplete project items).  These 
security plans define personnel policies and physical 
protection policies necessary to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and physical protection of 
the TCX during its entire life cycle.  
 
Another accomplishment is the establishment of a 
CM system that is physically isolated from the TCX 
development network and our campus network.  The 
CM system is administered and operated by a CM 
team whose members are not part of the TCX 
development team.  The Perforce software 
configuration management tool was selected for this 
project based on the analysis of available CM 
software [15]. 
 
3.4   Development Environment 
 
As part of our research, we are developing an 
automated documentation referencing system that can 
be used to facilitate traceability and correspondence 
between requirements specifications (both evaluation 
and engineering) and the TCX-SK implementation 
(both software and hardware).  We first developed 
the Documentation Development Standards 
document that describes the policy and process for 
authoring TCX documents.  Then we established the 
high-level requirements for an XML-centric 
Documentation Integration Environment (DIE).  The 
specifications and implementation of the initial 
version of the DIE have been completed, and the DIE 
is in use by the project team for the creation and 
requirements mapping of project documents.  
 
We have also completed both the Software 
Development Standards document and the design and 
construction of the prototype TCX development 
network.  The Software Development Standards 
document includes (1) processes for designing, 
approving and developing Configuration Items in 
conformance with the CM Plan, and (2) the TCX 
coding standards.  The TCX development network is 
built upon the NPS “Intranet” infrastructure. It 
utilizes Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology to 
provide developers with the security and flexibility to 
work from different locations within the campus. 
 
To meet EAL7 requirements, a TCX verification 
environment was developed in parallel with the 
software development environment.  The TCX 
verification tool requirements were defined, and the 
verification server and several candidate tool sets 
were assembled, including FDM, PVS, and ACL2. 
Investigation and experimentation is ongoing to 
determine suitability of each tool suite for the 





This paper describes the TCX project and its 
accomplishments to date.  During the first phase of 
research, we have established a working and reusable 
life cycle and development framework.  The next 
research phase will include the architectural design 
and initial implementation of the TCX-SK and TPE 
application, the development of a web-based 
dissemination system, and construction of the formal 
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